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Introduction:
Is the Supreme Court Failing at Its
Job, or Are We Failing at Ours?
Suzanna Sherry*
It is a pleasure and a privilege to write an introduction to this
Symposium celebrating Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's important new
book, The Case Against the Supreme Court.1 Chemerinsky is one of the
leading constitutional scholars of our time and a frequent advocate
before the U.S. Supreme Court. If he thinks there is a case to be made
against the Court, we should all take it very seriously indeed.
Chemerinsky's thesis may be stated in a few sentences. The
primary role of the Supreme Court, in his view, is to "protect the rights
of minorities who cannot rely on the political process and to uphold the
Constitution in the face of any repressive desires of political
majorities." 2 Canvassing the Court's performance over two centuries,
he concludes, first, that it has failed dismally at those tasks.
Nevertheless, he reaches two additional conclusions: he believes that
we can and should expect the Court to do better, and he outlines reforms
that might help it do so.
Chemerinsky makes a strong case that the Court has
historically failed to live up to its role. His primary historical
examples-from Dred Scott v. Sanford and Plessy v. Fergusonto Buck
v. Bell and Korematsu v. U.S.-are widely thought of as reprehensible.
*
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(His contemporary examples are more controversial, as Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick's contribution to the Symposium illustrates, 3 but
Chemerinsky really doesn't need those examples to support his
conclusions.) Where there is room for argument is on his second and
third conclusions: Is it reasonable to expect the Court to live up to
Chemerinsky's expectations, and how can we help ensure that it does
so?
In the pages that follow, constitutional scholars address these
questions. Professors Gerald Rosenberg and Corinna Lain argue that it
is unrealistic to expect the Court to escape political, cultural, and
structural constraints to rein in repressive popular majorities. "[T]he
Supreme Court is structurally and inherently conservative,"' 4 writes
Rosenberg, and "the practice of judicial review has done more harm
than good to those lacking power and privilege."5 Lain argues, similarly,
that the Court is ill-equipped to play the "heroic, countermajoritarian
role" that Chemerinsky expects of it. 6 This is especially true in the cases
that make up Chemerinsky's evidence of failure. As Lain puts it,
"history shows that when minorities are most vulnerable-when society
is itself repressive-the Justices are least likely to see the need to
protect." 7 Or as Rosenberg says, "what [the Court] cannot do is to
protect the vulnerable when the broader society is unwilling to do so."
Professors Ed Rubin and Barry Friedman take the opposite
position. Agreeing with Chemerinsky, they believe that the Court can
and should fulfill its rights-protecting role even in repressive times.
Rubin contends that even in 1927, when Buck v. Bell was decided, the
Justices should have been aware that sterilization was morally
reprehensible, politically controversial, and scientifically questionable. 9
The same Court that was vigorously protecting property rights in cases
like Lochner v. New York, he argues, should have been more sensitive
to rights of bodily integrity. Friedman has less to say about the
historical examples, but agrees with Chemerinsky's condemnation of
the Court for modern immunity doctrines that allow government

3.
Brian Fitzpatrick, A Tribute to Justice Scalia: Why Bad Cases Make Bad Methodology,
69 VAND. L. REV. 991 (2016).
4.
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Broken-Hearted Lover: Erwin Chemerinsky's Romantic
Longings for a Mythical Court, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2016).
5.
Id. at 1111.
6.
Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court "Failures"and a Story of Supreme Court
Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1022-23 (2016).
7.
Id.
8.
Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1111.
9.
Edward L. Rubin, The Supreme Court in Context: Conceptual, Pragmatic, and
Institutional,69 VAND. L. REV. 1115 (2016).
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officials to violate constitutional rights with impunity. 10 As Friedman
tells the Court: 'You had one job."'" Remedying violations of rights was
that one job, but immunity doctrines mean that instead of actually
deciding whether rights were violated-instead of "actually call[ing] . .
. balls and strikes"-the Court "defer[s] to the players themselves every
12
time something really troubling crosses [its] plate."'
Chemerinsky responds to Lain and Rosenberg with two points.
The first is to suggest that the question of whether the Court should
13
have been expected to do better is "far less important to [his] project"'
than is persuading his readers that the Court has failed, because he is
not interested in "moral blameworthiness." 14 The second-somewhat in
tension with the first-is to label the socio-political context of
lamentable decisions "an explanation, not an excuse" and to conclude
that in these decisions "the Court abandoned the underlying values of
15
the Constitution."'
But persuading his readers that the Court has failed-that it
has abandoned constitutional values-is the easy part. The hard part
is whether (and how) we can fix the problem. And here the battle lines
are drawn differently: It is Rosenberg against all the others. Even Lain,
who finds the historical mistakes all but inevitable given their context,
sees a silver lining.
Rosenberg, true nonbeliever that he is, holds out no hope for the
Court. The subtitle of his essay says it all: Chemerinsky's suggestions
for reform are nothing but "romantic longings for a mythical Court."
The core of the problem, according to Rosenberg, is judicial review itself,
which will always have the effect of "protect[ing] property and privilege
against attempts to regulate them." 16 And the solution is to reduce the
role of the Court: Keep judicial review but "vest[ ] appellate power over
decisions invalidating state and federal laws in Congress."' 17 Readers
will draw their own conclusions, but for me, Rosenberg's proposal is
terrifying. What on earth does he think the current Republican10. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 197-225.
11. Barry Friedman, Letter to Supreme Court (Erwin Chemerinsky is Mad. Why You Should
Care.), 69 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1015 (2016).
12. Id. at 1017. As Chemerinsky points out in his response, Friedman has previously taken
a somewhat different view, suggesting that public opinion exerts a powerful influence on the Court.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About the Supreme Court's Successes and Failures, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 919, 927 (2016).
13. Chemerinsky, supranote 12, at 928.
14. Id. at 929.
15. Id. at 928. The tension hes in the fact that it is hard to characterize the abandonment of
constitutional values as not morally blameworthy.
16. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1079.
17. Id. at 1112.
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controlled, Tea-Party-dominated Congress would do with--or to-Roe
v. Wade, Obergefell v. Hodges, Boumediene v. Bush, and dozens of other
cases protecting individual rights from repressive majorities? As
Chemerinsky puts it, "Congress operates in [the] same political context
[as the Court] and is even more likely to be responsive to it because its
18
members have to seek reelection."
So we come to the most difficult and important question: How
can we reduce the probability of the Court creating today's versions of
Korematsu and its ilk? The Case Against the Supreme Court offers
numerous suggestions, the most prominent of which is to limit Supreme
Court Justices to non-renewable 18-year terms. 19 Chemerinsky is not
the only proponent of term limits. Rosenberg says imposing term limits
is "supported by data, experience, and the findings of the branch
relations literature" and "makes sense." 20 Similar proposals have been
21
endorsed by others on both the left and the right.
Whether or not term limits are a good idea in the abstract,
however, they are unlikely to solve the particular problem that troubles
Chemerinsky: judicial abdication of the Court's role in protecting
individual rights. To the extent that the Court's failure lies in its refusal
to correct majority tyranny, term-limited Justices are less likely to
override majority preferences. First, a Court made up of Justices all
chosen within the past eighteen years (and half chosen within the
decade) is more rather than less likely to agree with contemporary
popular sentiments. Repressive times will breed repressive Justices,
without the potential tempering effect of colleagues from an earlier
generation. Second, a term-limited Justice will have to do something
after her term expires, and affiliating herself with unpopular views by
protecting individual rights will limit her options.
Chemerinsky's obvious response is that part of the problem is
the Justices' enforcement of property rights and states' rights-in other
words, that the Court not only refuses to invalidate trespasses on
individual rights, it also harms the politically vulnerable by striking
legislation meant to help them. 22 On this account, the longevity of the
Justices can produce what Rosenberg calls "judicial obstinance in the

18. Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 931.
19. As Rosenberg points out, none of Chemerinsky's other proposals are likely to do much
good. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1104-12.
20. Id. at 1109.
21.
See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 123-39 (2006);
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul

D. Carrington eds., 2005).
22.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 90-110.
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face of political change. ' 23 That's a fine argument for liberals, but not
as persuasive to those who believe that property rights or states' rights
are important constitutional values. As Chemerinsky himself says,
there was always a danger that The Case Against the Supreme Court
might be perceived as liberal whining, and he therefore set out "to make
a case against the Supreme Court that those all across the political
spectrum can accept. ' 24 To do so, however, he has to abandon his claim
that cases like Lochner or Hammer v. Dagenhart-to say nothing of
Citizens United or Shelby County-are evidence of the Court's failure.
He has to rest, in other words, on universally condemned cases like
Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu. 2 5 And those cases all involved judicial
failures to act, 26 more likely to be exacerbated than alleviated by term
limits.
The other participants in the Symposium offer some intriguing
approaches to the problem of the Court's failures. Lain turns failure
into success by suggesting that although we cannot expect the Court to
be heroic, it can-and does-still do a lot of good. First, as she argues
elsewhere, to the extent that legislative outcomes are not necessarily
reflective of majoritarianviews, the same impediments that prevent
the Court from fulfilling its role as countermajoritarian savior may
render it a more promising channel of progressive majoritarian
change. 27 Second, she argues that the Court created its own image as
guarantor of individual rights and protector of vulnerable minoritiesand that expectation can in turn create "a cadre of believers" who will
keep pushing boundaries until the cultural constraints ease and the
28
expectation becomes a reality.
A more indirect suggestion comes from Professor Neal Devins.
He analyzes the abortion cases to illustrate the effect of political context
on the success of minimalist (non-heroic) or maximalist (heroic)

23. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1110.
24. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 333-34.
25. Or even on modern cases like Hui v. Castaneda,559 U.S. 799 (2010), and Van de Kamp
v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009), for which Friedman takes the Court to task by suggesting that
everyone can agree that they are wrong. Friedman, supranote 11, at 1015-17.
26. Dred Scott is the lone exception. See generally, Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More
Judicial Activism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERATION
(Giorgi Areshidze,
Paul
Carrese, & Suzanna Sherry eds.,
forthcoming 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213372 [https://perma.cc/3DJF-NEDS] (listing universally condemned
decisions and suggesting that the vast majority involve judicial failures to act).
27. Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside.Down JudicialReview, 101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012).
28. Lain, supra note 6, at 1072-73.
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Supreme Court decisions. 29 His analysis is independently interesting
and also shows us how the Court can take political context into account
in a positive and productive way. Minimalist decisions work best, he
argues, when there is a possibility of political dialogue and compromise.
When dialogue and compromise are impossible because of political
conditions, however, the Court should issue maximalist decisions that
settle the issue. Thus, Devins suggests, Roe v. Wade was wrong for its
time: There was no hard-and-fast partisan divide on abortion, and
compromise was possible-and indeed occurred despite Roe-and so the
Court should have issued a minimalist decision incorporating an
indeterminate standard. Casey, on the other hand, was right for its
time: Compromise and political discourse were still alive and well in
1992, and Casey's minimalism allowed both to flourish. Devins shows
that beginning in 2010, however, political polarization has made both
dialogue and compromise impossible, and thus he urges the Court to
issue another maximalist decision, in other words, to "assume the
30
heroic role" that Chemerinsky embraces.
Devins's suggestion won't always solve the problem: A Court so
enmeshed in contemporary mores that it cannot see its way out of them,
as Lain and Rosenberg suggest happened in cases like Buck and
Korematsu, will not issue maximalist rights-protective decisions.
Nevertheless, it is a thoughtful approach to the problem that
Chemerinsky identifies.
Friedman offers a different sort of solution to what he calls the
"loss of faith" on both the right and the left. 31 He urges the Court to be
more institutionally transparent: cameras in the courtroom, more
information available online, shorter and clearer opinions, no more
issuing all the controversial opinions at the very end of the Term.
Unfortunately, none of these things are likely to satisfy critics-like
Chemerinsky-who think that the true problem is that the Court is
failing at its job of protecting rights.
Indeed, Friedman's suggestions are actually addressed to a
different problem, which he identifies: The public has lost faith that the
Court is "up to anything other than simple.., politics." 32 Chemerinsky's
book is merely Exhibit 1 in establishing the case against the Supreme
Court. According to Friedman (and I agree), Chemerinsky is just one of

29. Neal Devins, Rethinking JudicialMinimalism:Abortion Politics,PartyPolarization,and
the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935
(2016).
30. Id. at 936.
31. Friedman, supra note 11, at 1005.
32. Id.
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many, on the left and the right, who are frustrated because they see the
Justices as "ideological and result-oriented rather than reasoned
lawgivers." 33 Pundits, politicians, and scholars have now become
convinced that any decision with which they disagree must be based on
ideology. As Friedman puts it, "all of a sudden everyone seemed to think
the umpire was playing for some team-even if they could not say
34
exactly which one."
While Chemerinsky faults the Court for not protecting
individual rights, then, Friedman cuts through that lament to what he
sees as the underlying issue. Chemerinsky (and others on the left)
believe that the Justices wrongly turn their conservative political
preferences into constitutional law. As Friedman notes, of course, there
are many on the right who think the current Court is doing just the
opposite, constitutionalizing liberal political views. Hence the "loss of
faith" on both sides of the aisle.
And therein lies the real failure, and it is not primarily the
Court's. It is ours. Academics, especially legal academics, are in the best
position to educate the public-both directly and, through the media,
indirectly-about the Court and its role. If we describe the Court as
politically motivated, that view is bound to seep into public
consciousness sooner or later. Unfortunately, that is exactly how two
quite different groups of influential legal academics have characterized
the Court (and judicial decision-making generally) for the last several
decades.
As early as the 1960s, prominent attitudinalist political
scientists argued that judicial decisions are determined primarily by
the judge's politics, and very little by legal principles.3 5 Legal academics
used to take issue with that claim, but lately many have been implicitly
or explicitly accepting it. From popular constitutionalism 36 to
Friedman's magnum opus on how the Court follows public opinion 37 and
Rosenberg's insistence that expecting it to do otherwise is a hollow

33.
34.

Id. at 997.
Id. at 1006.

35.
See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
(1976); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
36.
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT
VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2003); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999).
37.
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
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hope,3 8 too many legal academics have bought the attitudinalist party
line. It doesn't help that many liberal friends of the Warren Court-like
Chemerinsky himself-have lately turned against the Court, and some
conservative critics of the Warren Court have developed a previously
undiscovered fondness for judicial activism. Such blatantly political
reversals lend support to the conclusion that the Court itself must be
political.
Beginning in the 1980s, another group of legal academics
adopted a post-modern approach, arguing that knowledge and reality
are social constructs made by those in power.3 9 Judicial decisionmaking, on this theory, is simply an exercise of political power.
Although the strongest form of social constructionism has largely faded
from legal scholarship, the mistrust of those in positions of powerincluding the Supreme Court-took its toll.
Now these dangerous misconceptions about what it is that
judges do in constitutional cases have reached the general public. No
wonder there is a crisis of faith. Attitudinalism and post-modernism,
watered down into a democracy-based critique of judicial decisionmaking as ideologically motivated, must take much of the blame. (To be
fair, one can also blame the late Justice Scalia, whose intemperate
attacks on his colleagues, such as the characterization of a recent
decision as "a naked judicial claim to legislative-indeed, superlegislative-power" 40 and a "judicial Putsch, '' 41 reinforced the notion
that the Court is a purely political body.)
Make no mistake, however, these are misconceptions. The Court
was never an umpire, calling balls and strikes, but neither are the
Justices members of political "teams" or legislators in robes who do
their best to enshrine their policy preferences into law. Judging
necessarily involves discretion but it is neither unconstrained nor
primarily political. A diverse array of internal and external
safeguards-from professional norms to the demands of collaboration
and opinion-writing-serves to cabin judicial discretion and channel
personal preferences into principled decision-making. 42

38.

See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
39. For a description and critique of this approach, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw (1997).

40.
41.
42.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
For elaborations of this argument, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,

JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009); Suzanna Sherry,

Politicsand Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV. 973 (2005).
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What Justices do in constitutional cases, in other words, is not
far removed from what they do in non-constitutional cases: they look to
text (if there is one), precedent, history, institutional considerations,
consequences, policy concerns, and common sense to reach the best
answer they can. Sometimes they get it wrong. When they do, the job of
academics is to explain why the Court's answer is wrong and encourage
it to do better. Instead, we have been attributing the Court's mistakes
to ideological differences. We should stop.
Chemerinsky has it half right, then. The Supreme Court can do
better, and we should urge it to do so. But the institutional changes he
suggests are unlikely to succeed. Moreover, his use of controversial
conservative decisions as contemporary examples of the Court's broader
failures exacerbates the problem by politicizing judicial decisionmaking.
In short, if we want the Court to live up to its role as a protector
of rights, we have to revive an older view of judging as reasoned
decision-making based on legal principles rather than as mere political
fiat.
That revival may, in the end, be impossible. As I write this,
Republican senators are adamantly refusing to vote on (or, in some
cases, even to meet with) President Obama's nominee for the Supreme
Court-a political moderate whom some of them have previously urged
as a potential nominee. A public official was willing to go to jail rather
than obey a Supreme Court decision. Political polarization among both
politicians and the general public is at an all-time high, and one scholar
has suggested that continued polarization is inevitable in a mature
43
democracy.
In such an atmosphere, it is probably foolish to expect anyone to
believe that Supreme Court Justices are capable of putting their politics
aside. Certainly none of the participants in this Symposium are naive
enough to believe it. So although it is indeed a pleasure and a privilege
to write this introduction, one part of me mourns Chemerinsky's book
and the responses to it as further evidence that we have irretrievably
lost our innocence.

43. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011).

